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PREFACE
The theory and practice of democracy may be viewed
from many different perspectives:
ing higher ends;

(1) as a means of achiev

(2) as a political method for the allocation

of finite resources;

(3) as a protective system to guard the

people from one another;

(4) as an authority structure in

which everyone is to have a semblance of equal say;

(5) as a

way to alleviate and resolve power conflicts among competing
factions;

(6) as a way of representing the masses in complex

political affairs;

(7) as an aspect of the distinctive and

often unique culture of a particular nation.
Whatever the perspective, democracy may be perceived,
especially in the United States, as pertaining to public
policy making, that is, political democracy.

There is also

the concept of industrial democracy which is, simply stated,
political democracy applied to the workplace.

Proponents of

industrial democracy contend it may provide new impetus to a
stagnating political democracy through the realization of the
democratic goal of participating in decisions affecting o n e ’s
life, including worklife.

It is my firm belief that indust

rial democracy enhances the attainment of this goal through
not only economic benefits, but that the participation
experience gained from the work place greatly increases the

political socialization of the "industrial democrat."
The Federal Republic of Germany is a nation which
has legislated a system of industrial democracy, and thereby
provides an opportunity to examine the consequences of a
post-industrial society attempting to securely establish
political democracy.

Pertinent reasons for studying indust

rial democracy in West Germany are threefold:

first, West

German labor-management relations have long been concerned
with industrial democracy and both labor and management have
adopted as their form of industrial democracy co-determina
tion, the particular subject of this thesis.

Second, I

place a high premium on the actualization of industrial
democracy in post industrial societies.

And third, the

nature and implications of industrial democracy have only
recently come to the attention of political scientists.'*"
Several questions may be addressed in considering
co-determination in West Germany and its implications for
other economically advanced nations.

How successfully have

the West Germans transferred democracy to industry?

Can the

practices and attitudes necessary for industrial democracy
be successful in light of the traditional authoritarianism of
West German industry?

In a general context and not limited

^"Edward S. Greenberg, "Industrial Self-Management and
Political Attitudes," The American Political Science Review
75 (March 1981): 29-43, cf. J. Maxwell Elden, "Political
Efficacy at Work: The Connection Between More Autonomous
Forms of Workplace Organization and More Participatory Poli
tics," The American Political Science Review 75 (March 1981):
43-59.

to the Federal Republic, one could ask whether industrial
democracy in any form is compatible with mass technological,
bureaucratic society?

How much democracy in industrial

decision-making is possible without detrimental interference
with the efficiency of production?

What conditions best

facilitate the practice of industrial democracy?

What are

the implications, not only in West Germany but elsewhere, of
instituting industrial democracy?

The list of questions may

go on and on, ad infintum, but the particular questions
addressed by this thesis are:

what historical political in

fluences and forces do and will condition the pattern of
industrial democracy, in this case West German co-determination, and which cultural factors have made co-determination
into a system maintenance implement rather than a system
change implement?
Unfortunately, due to my lack of German language
skills, the research for the thesis has had to be limited to
English language translations of primary sources and other
available secondary sources.

There is a plethorea of

original German works and writings on co-determination which
were inaccessible due to my limitations, but if possible
should be considered and consulted.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere apprecia
tion to Dr. Bruce Garver and Dr. Kent Kirwan for participat
ing on my Thesis Committee and taking and active interest in
its proceedings.

Also I would like to thank Dr. Orville
i

iii

Menard for his scholarly advice and encouragement, without
which I would surely never have finished this project.
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CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
IN WEST GERMANY
Many people today identify worker participation in
the industrial decision-making process with the sharing of
power suggested by industrial democracy.

A more restrained

attitude is that industrial democracy is simply a method to
provide employees with more information on the functioning
of their company.

Some content that participation inade

quately defines the problem, that the proper and more
important word is involvement.

In fact there is a continual

expansion of participation into new areas of politics, and
the range of issues which it includes is constantly increas
ing.

Sometimes this expansion is the result of legislation,

while other times it is the result of voluntary actions and
agreements.
In the broadest sense of the term, worker participa
tion covers three wide areas:

(1) the way in which employees

influence, or are enmeshed in, the decision-making process of
industrial enterprises;

(2) job satisfaction and work organi

zation, i.e., improving the quality of the job, making the
job more interesting, and defining the social organization
of work details?

(3) financial participation, which can in

clude profit sharing and employee stockholding, essentially a
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more equitable way of distributing capital.'*'

These are dif

fused areas of participation, and any specific example of
participation will include more than one— such as work
groups being responsible for organizing their own plan of
operation within the general production guidelines of the
plant.

Indeed, no one particular form of participation is

mutually exclusive, and in any situation the complete pattern
of participation must be seen as a coherent whole.
This thesis contends that patterns of participation
are not mutually exclusive and no one pattern will adapt it
self to every case, for what is correct in one situation may
be quite inappropriate in another.

Participation within an

organization has to be endogenous and molded to the particu
lar set of circumstances that are prevalent at the moment.
The form of participation depends, among other things, on
the type of industry, its history, particularly of industrial
relations, the size of the concern, the level of expectation
among the employees, and no less important, the political
structure that sets the parameters for these operations.
Worker participation in an iron works factory with 3,000
employees will be markedly different from that in a large
retail store.

And neither pattern will bear any more than a

cursory resemblance to what might be considered correct for
a small bakery primarily employing women as part-time
. Wallace Bell, Industrial Participation (London:
Pitman Publishing Ltd., 1979), pp. 220-221.
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employees.

Even within a single company, the pattern of

participation will often vary considerably from one section
to another.
In examining worker participation, one needs to be
clear about purposes.
purposes:

There are three basic and essential

(1) to improve the quality of working life and

the satisfaction workers gain from work;

(2) to improve the

quality of production and enhance efficiency within enter
prises;

(3) to give workers greater experience in and know

ledge of the affairs which affect their lives.

These are

complimentary purposes and may be considered equally impor
tant.

Experience gained from conditions at work promises to

allow the potential of participation fully to develop.

It is

the potential of democratizing the workplace which gives in
dustrial democracy its impetus and it is the experience with
industrial democracy that will breathe new life into polit
ical democracy.^
In the last three decades, many Western European
nations, such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands,
have independently followed the example set by West Germany
in actively supporting industrial democracy through the use
of various forms of co-determination.

Co-determination has

been introduced into the social and economic lives of the
aforementioned nations through legislation and regulation.
2

Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1970); and G.D.H. Cole,
Self Government in Industry (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1918).
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A common theme to ail co-determination legislation in Western
Europe is participation by labor representatives in the
decision-making processes of industrial organizations.

Co

determination laws are usually accompanied by additional
legal restrictions on the rights of management, restrictions
that primarily resolve and clarify any problems of interpre
tation and implementation that may be generated by the
co-determination laws.

The political significance of co

determination arises from the resulting reallocation of
authority, responsibility and, hence, power.

An analysis of

co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany must then
consider both the particular content of the various laws and
what effect these laws have upon the pecularities of West
. .
. .
.
3
German political socialization.
The Federal Republic of Germany was selected as the
subject of analysis for numerous reasons.

First, it is the

most populous and industrialized nation of Western Europe.
Second, its level of industrialization is rivaled only by
France and Britain.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the

abyssmal condition of Germany after the Second World War
created (particularly in the western sectors) the opportunity
to begin the political resocialization of the people with
what could be called "a clean slate."
Co-determination in industrial decision-making has
been a goal of the German (West German after 19 45) labor
3Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy
'
■ Germany
in
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969),
p. 161.
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movement and of its political ally, the Social Democratic
Party (SPD), almost since their inception in 1875.

The

struggle to assure worker representation on the boards of
industrial and other enterprises reached a milestone on
July 1, 1976, when legislation extending the coverage of
worker "Mitbestimmung"

(co-determination) went into effect.

4

The event did not give rise to any wild jubilation within the
German Trade Union Federation (DGB) or within the SPD, for
the 19 76 co-determination law did not provide for full-parity
representation for labor with managers and shareholders as
demanded by both the DGB and the SPD.

Instead the law

arranged matters in such a way that on issues on which labor
and capital representatives disagreed, the latter would pre
vail.
This deficiency of the 1976 law, from the employees'
perspective, can be traced chiefly to the fact that the
coalition of the SPD and the Free Democratic Party (FPD),
which has governed the Federal Republic of Germany since 1969,
had not been able to disagree on the terms of the co-deter
mination legislation.

The Free Democratic Party, representing

4
While the emphasis of this thesis is on West Germany,
hence post-1945, the historical development of the German
labor movement and its relation to the post-1945 institution
of co-determination cannot be neglected.
Recommended sources
on the pre-19 45 German labor movement include: Gerlad D.
Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany: 1914-1918
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Fritz Fischer,
War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914 (New York:
Norton Press, 1975); and Richard N. Hunt, The Creation of the
Weimar Republic: Still Born Democracy? (Lexington, MA: D.C.
Heath and Company, 1969).
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mainly business and professional people, had resisted fullparity co-determination until the end and had forced a
compromise formula on its larger, coalition partner.

5

That

the political climate on such matters had probably been
assessed correctly by the FPD was confirmed by the results
of the national elections held on October 3, 19 76, in which
the so-called social-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP barely
retained power.

The opposition Christian Democratic Union

(CDU) and its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social
Union (CSU), captured 48.6 percent of the popular vote and
reduced the SPD-FPD majority in the Bundestag from forty-six
to ten seats.
Neither the passage of the 19 76 law nor the results
of the two subsequent elections has assuaged the demands of
the unions for full-parity co-determination.

The conviction

that only by gaining a fully equal voice with management
could industrial democracy be achieved is deeply rooted in
the West German labor movement.

But a full understanding

of this phenomenon cannot be attempted without working
definitions which describe the terminology of co-determination.
Industrial democracy is the transfer of political
democracy to the workplace.

Co-determination is the

5Guido Goldman, The German Political System (New York:
Random House, Inc., 1974), p. 138.
^E.C.M. Cullingford, Trade Unions in West Germany
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976), p. 95.
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realization of some aspects of political democracy in the
workplace, such as:

one man, one vote; representative

government which is freely elected; responsibility and
accountability; and the right of petition.

7

In order to

establish and maintain co-determination, it is necessary to
have some form of organizational infrastructure, and all
national variations of co-determination have a similar in
frastructure to that of West Germany’s, with only slight
g
deviations.
The infrastructure of co-determination within
a typical West German joint-stock company will consist of
the general meeting, the supervisory board, the management
board, the labor director, and the works council.
The general meeting is a meeting of the shareholders.
Usually the meeting takes place once a year, at which time
the voting right is determined by the amount of shares a
person owns.

The general meeting is above all responsible

for the following matters:

any increases or decreases in

capital; any change in form, merger, or dissolution of the
company; election and dismissal of supervisory board members;
utilization of the annual profit; and the approval of acts of
the management board and supervisory board.

In reality,

7

David Jenkins, Job Power: Blue and White Collar
Democracy (New York and Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1974),
pp. 3-4.
^Roger Harrison, Worker’s Participation in Western
Europe: 19 76 (London: Institute of Personnel Management,
1976), passim.
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however, its legal and factual possibilities of exerting in
fluence are by far fewer than one would assume on the basis
of this catalogue of formal rights.
The supervisory board, in practice, has a consider
ably stronger position than the general meeting.

Its major

tasks are the appointment and dismissal of the management
board as well as the supervision of the company*s management.
Moreover, the bylaws of the company or the supervisory board
itself may provide that certain matters require the consent
of the supervisory board.

It is quite usual that investment

and extensions above a certain financial volume, credits and
loans above a certain limit, as well as the recruitment and
dismissal of managerial staff will require supervisory board
consent.

For all reasons the supervisory board, which in

contrast to the general meeting meets twice to four times a
year, has considerable influence on the fundamental managerial
decisions of the company.
The management board conducts the day-to-day business
of the company on its own cognizance.

It has not only entre

preneurial functions in the narrow sense of the word but also
functions as a supervisor of the company’s employees.

The

functions of the management board are assigned to its indi
vidual members so that each member is responsible for a par
ticular field (i.e., technical, commercial, and financial
matters) or for a particular division of the company.

Irre

spective of his/her special tasks, each management board

9
member is responsible for overall company policy within the
factory or plant.
A labor director (or workers1 director) is to be
appointed as a full member of the management board.

The

labor director is appointed under the same conditions as
other members of the management board, e.g., by the super
visory board.

Therefore, employees have no veto power.

The

labor director has specific competences in staff and social
matters also.

These include:

arranging sick-leave; prepar

ing vacation packages; and allocating over-time work to
employees.
The works council safeguards the interests of the
employees in dealings with the employer.

Works councils are

to be elected for a term of office of three years in any
company of private industry with at least five employees
which have voting rights.

An employee is considered to have

voting rights if he/she is an adult and works full-time.
Employers and managerial employees are not represented on the
works council.

Works councils have far-reaching rights of

participation and co-determination in matters concerning the
structuring, organization and design of jobs, operations and
the working environment, manpower planning and personnel
9
Taking account of the special interests of both
young employees, who usually have not yet completed their
training, and of the disabled, the works council provides for
youth delegations and representatives of the disabled to look
after the interests of these categories of employees.
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management, as well as in-plant training.

The works councils

have a genuine right of co-determination in a series of mat
ters such as:

working hours, e.g., the introduction of

short-time work; the introduction and use of technical de
vices designed to monitor the behavior or performance of the
employees; the assignment and notice to vacate company-owned
accommodations; and the fixing of job and bonus rates and
comparable performance related remuneration.^
"Reform from above, rather than revolution from
below" has been the political maxim of Germany since the
advent of the Second Reich, and it is no different today in
West Germany.

The West Germans have shown a propensity to

avoid domestic and industrial conflict whenever possible.
Consequently, they have placed enormous faith in legislation
and mediation to resolve many social and political problems.
Since the scope and content of West German social legislation
is very inclusive and extremely detailed, an inspection of
the entire subject would be lengthy and out of place considering the subject of this thesis. 11

What is proposed is an

examination of the most important and relevant legislation
Adolf Strumthal, Workers Councils: A Study of Work
place Organization on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 63.
11

See Hajo Holborn, Germany and Europe: A Historical
Essay (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1970) and
Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy: 1918-19 33 (New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 196 4).

concerning co-determination.

Chapter Two will provide a

historical perspective of the German (after World War II,
the West German)

labor movement in relation to its goal of

industrial democracy.

What is necessary is to develop the

salient factors in the labor movement that have been the
most influential in labor's acceptance of co-determination as
a way of industrial life.
The third chapter will examine co-determination
legislation passed by the West Germany Parliament, providing
a critical analysis of both the content and intent of these
laws which are not numerous, but legalistic and complex.
Within the parameters of these laws, all subsequent legisla
tion has been enacted.

The affectations of the major co

determination laws upon West Germany have reshaped many
aspects of society.

Significantly, co-determination has

given substance to aspirations for industrial democracy in
modern post-industrialized West Germany.
Chapter Four discusses the policy and institutional
implications and effects of co-determination participation
in the current socio-political realm of West Germany.

In

other words, can participation of workers be effective within
the traditional authority structure of contemporary industry?
Following from that, should workplace participation be en
couraged as a means of allowing the worker to become
democratized?

The answers to these questions will provide an

12
indication of the current status of industrial democracy
within the context of post-industrial society and serve as a
departure point for evaluating the possibility of enhancing
democracy, in general, through the structure of co-determination.

My analysis is directed towards the goal of a better

understanding of the potential of industrial participation
(co-determination)

and the possibility that participation

at the workplace will lead to increased participation in the
political decision-making.
Some often neglected aspects of industrial democracy
will be the subject of Chapter Five.

Perhaps the most

neglected aspect is what effect does industrial democracy
have upon the "minorities" of the industrial workforce?
Migrant and immigrant workers are two of the "minorities,"
people who have been treated as industrial cannon-fodder by
the employers, governments, and even labor unions in the socalled "host" country.

Women, as an increasingly larger part

of the workforce, are also of special concern.

The partici

pation of married women in the process of industrial democracy
is dramatically restricted by their socialization and the
basic fact that they often bear the burden of two full-time
jobs:

one as a housewife and mother, and the other as an

employee.
Thus Chapter Six will serve two functions.
function will be an evaluation of the thesis.

The first

Has co-deter

mination been successful in establishing industrial democracy
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in West Germany?

And, has democratization of the workplace

been beneficial to political democracy, in a reciprocal re
lationship?

The second function will be to examine the

relevance of the West German experience, with its particular
form of industrial democracy, co-determination, as a guide
and model for other nations of the industrial world.
Participation, co-determination, and industrial
democracy are not a panacea.

The possibility that through

participation in the industrial decision-making process
Western man may be able to achieve a higher state of ration
ality and objectivity may be utopian fantasy.

Given growing

alienation, apathy, and economic stagnation, industrial
democracy may be a social experiment that failed.

Co-deter

mination in West Germany has been in effect for little over
three decades.

In other nations of the West, co-determina-

tion (or industrial democracy in any of its forms) has had a
much more brief existence.

Perhaps a sufficient amount of

time has not transpired for a complete examination and evalu
ation of industrial democracy.

However, there is a need for

at least an initial investigation of what industrial democ
racy has accomplished in West Germany.

14

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CO-DETERMINATION
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
For over one hundred years, the German labor movement
has sought for workers not only political recognition through
political parties and industrial recognition through trade
unions, but representation in the governing bodies of indust
rial enterprises, generally under the slogan of "Mitbestimmung"

(loosely translated as worker participation).^

The

fact is that since the days of the Weimar Republic, the
German labor movement has been successful in establishing a
trade union structure and works councils in industrial or
ganizations, and since World War II has been able to place
worker representatives on the governing boards of industrial
enterprises, in varying numbers and with greater or lesser
successes in having these representatives effectively voice
and instigate worker demands.
Given this history, the questions this chapter will
examine are these:

what has been the record of the German

labor movement in achieving worker participation?

Why have

Hif. Michael Blumenthal, Co-determination in the
German Steel Industry: A Report of Experience (Princeton,
New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 15.
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the demands for co-determination taken the particular forms
associated with the German labor movement?

What difference,

if any, has co-determination had on the functioning of the
West German economy?
West Germanyfs reconstruction after World War II was
not a new beginning in all aspects of politics and society,
but a reemergence of some very important and persistent
elements of past German life.

Perhaps the most important of

these were the twin institutions of the labor movement:

its

political party, the SPD, and its industrial organization,
the unified trade union movement.

To be sure, the present

German Trade Union Federation (Deutsche Gewerkschaftbund or
DGB) differs somewhat from its pre-19 33 predecessors, but the
major orientation of the trade unions did not change appreciably.

2

What is most significant in that pre-19 33 structure

that has survived and that merits attention in understanding
the developments of the post-war period?
The German labor movement was the principal focus of
the major issues confronting socialism before 1914:

revolu

tionary versus evolutionary socialism, expressed in the
contrasting views of Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein.

3

2 .

Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich: A Social
History of Nazi Germany (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971),
pp. G-7.
3
A . J . Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany: From Bismarck
to Brandt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p.
46.
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It is not much of an exaggeration to say that in the case of
the German labor movement, the voice was often that of
Kautsky, but the hand was that of Bernstein; that is to say,
the program and the rhetoric were those of Kautsky, but the
movement in action was an evolutionary one, eventually aban4
doning the Marxist tradition in 1959.
Until 1918 and even
to 19 33, the voice of the SPD was that of class struggle and
conflict, and as long as it retained that voice, the SPD
sought in vain the achievement of majority party status,
A second important aspect of the German labor move
ment was its rapid bureaucratization.

The labor movement,

which originated in a spirit of revolution against the exist
ing state and bureaucracy, seemed to adopt quickly the central
features of the system that the movement was dedicated to
5
opposing.
How rapidly this bureaucratization of party and
trade union took shape can be judged by the fact that Robert
Michels1 classic statement of the iron law of oligarchy bears
the date 1915, and the subject of his inquiry was the German
labor movement,^

This bureaucratic heritage continues to

leave its mark on the contemporary labor movement.

The

4
Helga Grebing, The History of the German Labor Move
ment; A Survey (London: Oswald Wolff, 1969), p. 181.
5

E.C.M. Cullmgford, Trade Unions m West Germany
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), pp. 11-12.
^Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological
Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy
(New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 342-357.
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tightness of organization, the discipline that reaches upward,
in the degree of obedience to national union leadership con
stitutes one of the strengths of contemporary organizations.
Party and trade unions do not always speak or act in unison,
but when they do they constitute a major force in the polity.
A third historical element that will aid' in under
standing the contemporary labor movement is its commitment
to industrial democracy.

The most dramatic and significant

form of this commitment was the ’’Works Council Movement, "
through which the workers desired to take into their own hands
the direction not only of industry, but also the state.

7

The

Works Council Movement in Germany was clearly a part of a
wider social phenomenon:

rejection of parliamentary govern

ment and the territorial state, which found expression in
Russian soviets and, though in a very different form, Italian
corporatism.

Here corporatism is defined as "of or pertain

ing to a political system under which the principal economic
functions, as banking, industry, labor, etc., are organized
as corporate unities.”

Yet when the Hohenzollern Monarchy

collapsed and the leaders of the SPD took over the state
machinery, they found themselves comfortable in their new
bureaucratic roles, and in short order were at odds with the
Works Council Movement, which threatened the power base the
SPD had just acquired.
7

The SPD was not prepared to overturn

Nabagopal Das, Experiments m Industrial Democracy
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 66-68.
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completely the government and administrative machinery that
seemed to be bulwarks against chaos, and in the end the
works councils were restricted to an intra-enterprise scope
g
of action.
However, within that context, the works
councils became an established element in German industrial
organization, though clearly stripped of most of their
functional characteristics.

In this they probably fared no

worse than the Russian soviets and much better than the
Italian corporations.

But it is this heritage that has

given the German works councils their staying power and that
accounts for the manner in which they seem to fit easily
into the F R G rs social structure.
One of the more dramatic elements of German recon
struction after 1945 was the reemergence of the SPD and the
trade union organizations.

Though treated with more or less

favor, depending on the policies of the occupying power,
party and unions provided a framework for the reinstitution
g
of organized political and economic action.
Because these
institutions continue to function in the FRG, one more nearly
appreciates their role in reconstruction.

What is almost

forgotten today is that the social climate in the western
occupation zones of Germany was decidedly anti-capitalist
and strongly reformist.

Clauses authorizing socialization of

g
Sturmthal, Workers Councils, p. 54.
9
Herbert J. Spiro, The Politics of German Codeter
mination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 21.
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the means of production were written into some of the early
state constitutions

(Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia), and

these clauses advocated far-reaching restraints on the
capitalist s y s t e m . P a r t l y this reflected the social con
cerns of the Roman Catholic church expressed in the ency
clicals of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI, but the shame and
horror felt in western Germany after the demise of Hitler's
regime also played a role in producing a liberal, reformist
climate of opinion, not duplicated since those early years of
reconstruction. ^
The reform impetus reached its peak in 1951 when the
passage of legislation setting up worker participation in the
governing councils of the coal and steel industries.

12

After

that, only minor adjustments were made in provisions for
worker participation in industrial decision-making, and even
the 1976 laws fall considerably short of parity co-determina
tion, the ultimate goal of the labor movement.

Under the

dual impact of the "economic miracle" and the long tenure of
Konrad Adenauer and the CDU, West Germany's social climate
became increasingly conservative, with twenty-five years
elapsing between the coal and steel bill and the present
extension of worker participation.
10

.

.

Thus the SPD and the

.

Spiro, The Politics of German Codetermination, p.

37.
*^Ibid. , p . 58 .
12

Blumenthal, Co-determination xn the German Steel
Industry, pp. 18-21.
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trade unions became integrated into the FRG's polity and
society.
Features of the Federal Republic of Germany that help
define the significance of industrial democracy are the
following.

Persistent assertations of the CDU governing

elite and of its U.S. supporters notwithstanding, what one
can observe in the FRG is not simply a traditional market
economy, or even a social market economy where the government
has more control over production, but the emergence of demo
cratic corporatism--perhaps pluralistic corporatism would be
more accurate.

Therefore, while the FRG meets many of the

normative standards of a post-industrial, democratic politi
cal system, its socio-economic patterns are essentially
corporatist; that is to say, social and economic actions take
place in a framework of legally defined and publicly sanctioned functional organizations. 13

Within this context,

what has actually developed in West Germany is a pluralistic
political system in which the major parties are based in good
part, though not entirely, on class voting.

In the 19 72

national election the SPD had been able to attract whitecollar, middle class voters.

But in the state elections held

between 1972 and 1976, and in the 1976 and 1980 national
elections, many of these swing voters seemed to have returned
13 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change:
Modernization, Development and Politics," Comparative
Politics 3:3 (April 1971), pp. 282-322.
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to their natural conservative homeland in the CDU/CSU. 14
In this respect the Federal Republic of Germany must
be distinguished from the group politics system of the United
States.

Certainly the appearances are similar; in both,

there are labor organizations, business organizations, relig
ious groups, and so on, attempting to influence public policy.
In the United States patterns of participation are relatively
amorphous and organized groups have independent rights of in
put, social life, and economic decision-making, which to a
certain extent have no connection with individual organiza
tions.

The participation may be as casual or as formal as

the particular groups decide upon.
In West Germany, by contrast, functional organiza
tions in society and economy have structures, procedures,
and so forth defined by law, and their interactions take
place in the confines of governmental procedures.

Further

more, these functional organizations are entitled to be
consulted and have a significant voice in shaping public
policy regarding their particular economic or social
sectors.

15

Seen from either a "right" or "left" perspective,

worker participation in industrial decision-making might be
no more than a clever device to calm and co-opt the workers1
demands.

But perceived from the strong tradition of socio-

■^Stephen Smith, "The Politics of Success," Time,
October 13, 1980, p. 60.
15
197.

Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, p.
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economic corporatism, demands to have worker representatives
on enterprise boards is a legitimate method of making demands
and assuring their satisfaction in a corporatist system.
Much of the debate involving co-determination becomes unin
telligible when seen from the viewpoint of industrial
relations in Great Britain or the United States.

It requires

the historical context of the German (after World War Two the
West German) labor movement and contemporary West German
politics to gain an accurate investigation of these develop
ments .
One final element of the post-1949 historical con
text must be specified:

the dynamics of coalition politics,

already briefly noted, which has shaped the impetus of
national policy since 1966.

Initially with the "Great

Coalition" of 1966-1969, the SPD, participating in the
government for the first time since the Weimar Republic,
attempted to change the FRG along lines congenial to its
own basic ideology and policy preferences.

16

The "Great

Coalition" was succeeded in 1969 by the present governing
coalition in which the SPD became the senior partner, but
remained dependent on the FPD for a majority of the
Bundestag. 17

After having successfully tackled "Ostpolitik"

■^Guido Goldman, The German Political System, p. 116.
17

The narrow margin by which the social-liberal coali
tion remains in power at the national level is further compli
cated by the manner in which the federal system divides power
without necessarily dividing responsibility in the same
measure.
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in the first three years of its tenure, the social-liberal
coalition then attempted to enact major domestic policy re
forms, but with little success,

for the bipartisan agreement

on "Ostpolitik" was replaced by persistent and often major
disagreement on social policy.

As a result, the SPD was un

able to redeem more than a fraction of the far-reaching
social programs on which it had contested the 1976 election:
co-determination, profit sharing, and urban land use regula
tion.

The present coalition has definitely abandoned any

hope for the last two, in good part because of the energy
crisis and the subsequent economic slow-down.

To what extent

it was able to pass worker participation legislation that
approached the full-parity goal of the trade unions will be
examined in Chapter Three.

It is in this historical context

that one may approach an analysis and understanding of co
determination legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany.
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CHAPTER III
THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF CO-DETERMINATION
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
It may appear to be rather perplexing to an outside
observer of the West German labor relations scene that the
post-World War Two political struggle over labor co-determina
tion has resulted in the enactment of three different pieces
of legal regulations, with differing coverage and varying
degrees of labor participation in the managing of business
firms.

However, this seems to be typical of the West Germans

to resolve labor-management disputes with legislation.

This

chapter will present the major laws and amendments concerning
co-determination and workers1 participation in West German
industry.
After the Second World War, the West German trade
unions, congenial with the declared intentions of the British
occupying forces, endorsed proposals to nationalize the
"montan" industries
industries)

(mining and iron and steel producing

in the British occupied zone.'*"

The changing

socio-economic climate during the ensuing years showed, how
ever, that such a solution was politically unattainable, and
^Jenkins, Job Power, pp. 116-119.

25
a compromise was found in a somewhat different direction.
British control had brought about a full-parity solution
that amounted to an equal share of seats for the shareholders
and the employees in the supervisory council of the decartelized business firms, m

the montan industries.

2

Furthermore, the unions obtained the right to nominate
candidates for the newly established position of the socalled labor director, an equal-ranking member of corporate
3

executive boards.

The first post-war West German Bundestag of 19 49 saw
an unexpected majority for the conservative parties

(CDU,

CSU, FPD, and German Party, as well as several splinter par
ties) , viz. 256 seats as opposed to 146 seats for the left
bloc, which was comprised of the SPD (131) and the German
Communist Party (KPD)

(15).

The preliminary parity solution

for the montan industry, introduced under the auspices of
the British occupation forces, was endangered.

Under the

massive threat of nationwide strikes, and after heated dis
cussion in and out of the Bundestag, the West German govern
ment was forced to single out the montan complex for separate
legislative treatment.

The post-war controversy over co

determination in the montan industry culminated in the "Act
2

W. Michael Bluenthal, Co-determination m the German
Steel Industry, p. 19,
3
F.E. Emery and Einar Thorsrud, Form and Content m
Industrial Democracy: Some Experiences from Norway and Other
European Countries (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd.,
1964), pp. 44-47.
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on Co-determination of Employees in the Supervisory Councils
and Executive Boards of the Business Firms in the Mining and
Iron and Steel Producing Industries" of 1951, the Montan
4
Act.
The Act applies to all firms in the mining and iron
and steel industries if they are operated under the charter
of a corporation, are a limited liability company or a joint
company of mine owners, and if they have in general more than
1,000 employees.

5

If the firm's charter does not require the

institution of a supervisory board, such a board has now to
be organized.

The supervisory board consists of eleven

elected members, whereby both the shareholders and the em
ployees respectively nominate four members and an additional
external member each.

The law stipulates that the external

members may be neither a representative of a trade union nor
of an employer organization nor employed by that firm or
g
otherwise connected with it in some economic way.
The electing body for all nominated members of the
supervisory board is the shareholders* general meeting,
which usually convenes twice yearly.

The general meeting

4
The Montan Act is reprinted m International Labor
Organization, Co-determination in the Federal Republic of
Germany (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 19 76),
cited hereafter as ILO.
5
ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 1, section 1, para
graphs 1 and 2, pp. 76, 77.
^ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 2, section 4, para
graphs 1 and 2, pp. 77, 78.
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approves the nominees and elects the owners1 representatives
and confirms the nominations and elects the employers1 re
presentatives.

Two of the employees' five representatives

are nominated by the works council, whereby one representa
tive must come from the group of salaried employees and the
other from the group of wage-earning employees.

It is

interesting to note that the unions concerned can veto the
7
. .
nominations.
The remaining three board members, i.e., the
two further employee representatives and the external,
additional member for the labor bloc, are nominated by the
unions, with no veto power for the works council.

Altogether,

only two of the employees’ five representatives on the super
visory board must come from the firm under consideration.

In

addition, labor’s direct preference is restricted by the
g
union’s veto right.
The Montan Act also stipulates the nomination of the
so-called neutral member, chosen by the directly elected
members of the supervisory board.

This eleventh member— the

fifteenth or the twenty-first member for extended boards,
cases that will be considered shortly--deserves special
attention.

The neutral member will be elected by majority

vote of the board members, whereby at least three of the
7

ILO, Montan Act, 19 51, part 2, section 6, para
graphs 1-5, pp. 78-79.
g
Thomas Kennedy, European Labor Relations (Lexington,
Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Co., 1980), p. 186.
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employees1 and three of the shareholders1 representatives
have to support his election.

The notion behind the concept

of the neutral member is to prevent possible stalemate situ
ations and to endorse the ’’public" interest in the decision9
making process of the modern capitalistic enterprise.
In accordance with West German corporate laws, the
supervisory board appoints the management board.

The super

visory board elects the so-called labor director, a full and
equal member of the management board but depending in a
special way on the trust of labor’s representatives.

The

labor director cannot be elected against the votes of the
majority of the employees’ members in the supervisory
board.^

But the law does not specify in a concrete and

clearcut way the labor director's tasks and responsibilities.
Only by assigning distinct areas to the different members of
the management board is the scope of activities for the labor
director implicitly demarcated.

In practice, the labor di

rector is responsible for personnel and social matters.
In previous discussion it was assumed that the super
visory board had eleven members.

If a firm's nominal capital

exceeds 20 million DM (approximately $10 million U.S.), the
maximum number on the board is fifteen.

If the nominal

9
Nabagopal Das, Experiments in Industrial Democracy,
p. 73.
■^ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 3, section 13, para
graphs 1 and 2, p. 82.
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capital is higher than 50 million DM (approximately $25 mil
lion U.S.), the electing bodies may appoint twenty-one
members.

The change in the number of board members involves

a change in the composition of the employees* representatives.
In the case of fifteen board members, the works council
nominates three, viz. one salaried employee and two wageearning employees, and the unions nominate four members,
including the additional external member.^^

In the case of

twenty-one members, the works council nominates a further
wage-earning employee, and the unions have the option for six
candidates.

The general rules for the election of the neutral

member apply without change.

12

As already mentioned, special historical circumstances
combined with massive political pressures forced the first
West German government to single out the montan complex for
special legislative treatment.

The next important legisla

tion, the social constitution for all firms of the private
economic sector, the Works Constitution Act, was enacted in
1952, one year after the introduction of the Montan Act,
which remains lex specialis on the issue of managerial co13
determination for the montan industries.

The Montan Act

■^ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 2, section 9, para
graph 1, p. 81.
12

ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 2, section 9, para
graph 2, p. 81.
13ILO, Montan Act, 1951, pp. 93-98.
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fell short of original union aspirations and their farreaching implications.

There is little wonder that the

trade unions considered this legislative framework only as
an uneasy compromise or an intermediate step in the process
of what they call ’’democratization" of the economy, a conceptual analogy to their political system. 14
The Works Constitution Act provides general regula
tions for three different levels of employee participation
and co-determination in all firms outside the montan indus
tries with at least five, full-time, adult employees.

The

first level concerns the independent rights of the single
employee on the personal stage, e.g., rights to information,
hereing and discussion of issues concerning the workshop
place, fields of activity, remuneration, and so on.

At the

plant level, the act prescribes the institution of a works
council, an independent representative body of all employees,
which is required if the firm has five or more permanent em
ployees.

In addition to this, if the company is employing

more than five adolescents

(persons under 18 years old), a

youth council has to be established. 15
On the decision-making level of the whole firm,
finally, participation in management found a general
14

Cullmgford, Trade Unions in West Germany, p. 67.
15
,
The Works Constitution Act of 1952 is reprinted m
International Labor Organization, Co-determination in the
Federal Republic of Germany (Geneva: International Labor
Organization, 1976), hereafter cited as ILO, Works Constitu
tion Act, 1952.
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regulation.

Under the Works Constitution Act, one-third of

the members of the supervisory board must be labor representatives who are elected by the firm's employees.

16

Before the enactment of the Co-determination Act of
1976, which sets apart large firms for special regulation
without invalidating the Montan Act, the Works Constitution
Act provided the general legislative framework for the codetermination issue m

West Germany.

17

In this context, the

main provision on co-determination is employees being denied
parity on supervisory boards.
Amendment of 19 72,

18

In its 1952 version and the

the act stipulates one-third worker

co-determination for corporations and partnerships limited
by shares, as well as for limited liability companies, joint
companies of mine owners, and business co-operatives with
more than five hundred employees.

If the business charter

does not already require the institution of a supervisory
board, such a board has to be established.

Exceptions from

the one-third co-determination are made for family corpora
tions with less than five hundred employees, for so-called
"tendenct" firms

(i.e., business firms with political, union

ist, denominational, charitable, educational, scientific, or
16 ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, division 5,
section 76, paragraph 1, p. 96.
17
18

ILO, Works Constitution Act, pp. 46-72.
ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, pp. 103-192.
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artistic aims or serving purposes of reporting or expressing
opinion) and for religious groups and their charitable and
educational institutions.

19

If the firmfs charter prescribes six supervisory
board members, which requires two labor representatives, only
employees of the firm under consideration are eligible for
the supervisory board.

In the cases of more employee repre

sentatives, at least two must be members of the respective
firm.

Additional members may be added from outside, e.g.,

from the unions.

It is interesting to note that under the

1952 Works Constitution Act the unions have neither a right
to nominate the internal employee candidates nor a right to
advise the employees on that matter.

Even the rights of the

works council are rather restricted in this context.

Having

only the same rights as other employee groupings, the works
council may simply propose a list of candidates. 20

The

candidates for the supervisory board are elected by all em
ployees according to the rules of direct proportional voting.
The voting procedure does not provide different treatment for
salaried and wage-earning employees.

The only structural

qualification concerning the list of candidates stems from
the fact that the federal legislators felt the interests of
19

.
...
ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, division 5,
section 76, paragraph 6, p. 97.
20 ILO, Works Constitution Act, 19 52, division 5,
section 76, paragraph 3, p. 97.
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female employees better safeguarded by female representatives
on the board.

If the firm has more than fifty percent female

employees, at least one of the employees* representatives on
21
the supervisory board has to be female.
In the years after the introduction of the Montan Act,
the structure of West Germany's economy changed considerably.
Certain business firms that had been subject to the Montan
Act underwent so many structural changes that they no longer
fitted that act's criteria.

To prevent these firms from es

caping the Montan A c t 's original legal requirements and
thereby becoming subject to the one-third parity requirement
of the Works Constitution Act, the federal legislators issued
several amendments, collectively referred to as the Codetermination Protection Acts. 22
The first of these amendments was the 1956 Supplement
Act on Co-determination (Act to Supplement the Acts on Co
determination of Employees in the Supervisory Boards and
Management Boards of the Business Firms in Mining and Iron
23
and Steel Producing Industries).

This act is more commonly

referred to as the Amendment on Holding Companies.

For

corporations, limited liability companies, or joint stock
21

ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, division 5,
section 76, paragraph 2, pp. 96-9 7. See Sturmthal, Works
Councils, pp. 65-66.
22

Harrison, Workers' Participation in Western Europe,

p. 42.
23ILO, pp. 83-92.
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companies which dominate a business firm that falls under the
Montan Act of 1951, the Amendment on Holding Companies applies
as follows.

If the production activities of the dominating

firm fall themselves under the criteria of application for
the Montan Act, the Montan Act of course remains directly
applicable.

If this is not the case, but the production of

the business combined is significantly determined by the pro
duction of firms falling under the provisions of the act of
1951, the holding amendment of 1956 prescribes that the Montan Act applies to the dominating firm also.

24

This amendment brings about some important legisla
tive changes from the original version of the Montan Act.

It

must be recalled that in the Montan Act the works council
nominated two candidates for the election to the supervisory
board, with a veto right for the unions concerned.

The Amend

ment on Holding Companies introduces a primary election,
whereby the electors are directly chosen by the firm's employees.

25

. .
The position of the unions is significantly

reduced, because with, in general, fifteen members on the
supervisory board the unions retain nominating right for only
three members
Act).

(as compared to four according to the Montan

In addition to this, the union veto power concerning

the candidates of the union's persuasion become more
24

ILO, Amendment on Holding Companies, article 1,
section 2, p. 84.
25

ILO, Amendment on Holding Companies, article 1,
section 6, paragraphs 3 and 4, p. 86, 87.
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independent of the unions because their removal from office
2g
is rendered more difficult.
A court order, pending sub
mittal of an important reason for the planned removal, must
first be realized.

However, the position of the shareholders

is somewhat strengthened, because under the new provisions
the labor director may be elected against the votes of the
labor representatives on the supervisory board.
The second amendment to the Montan Act was the 196 7
27
Modification Act to the Co-determination Act.
The major
criteria of the amendment1s applicability was if the sales
revenue from mining or iron and steel producing activities
of a business firm fell below fifty percent of the total
revenue during two consecutive years, the dominant firm
would, under the Amendment on Holding Companies, drop out of
the Montan A c t ?s regulation and would therefore be subject
to the less restrictive jurisdiction of the Works Constitu
tion Act, with only one-third worker parity on the supervisory
board.
The controversy over decision-making and co-determination of employees in West Germany found its apogee in the
Act on the Co-determination of Employees, which was passed in
26

ILO, "Amendment on Holding Companies," 1956,
article 1, section 10, paragraph 1, p. 89.
27
Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker
Participation in the Federal Republic of Germany," in The
Economics of Co-determination, ed. David F. Heathfield
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 19 77).
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1976.

28

This act, a somewhat moderated version of the Montan

Act, applies to large firms not affected by earlier legisla
tion.

Two observations must be stated at the beginning.

First, the Montan Act is not annulled by the legislation of
1976, for this law explicitly excludes those business firms
for which co-determination is settled by the Montan Act of
1951 and the Co-determination Protection Acts of 1956 and
1967.

Second, the one-third parity provisions under the

Works Constitution Act of 1952 still apply for smaller-sized
business firms not covered by the 19 76 Co-determination Act.
As in the case of the 19 52 act, so-called tendency enter
prises remain exempt.

These are here defined as enterprises

serving political, coalition political, denominational,
charitable, educational, scientific, or artistic designations
or purposes that are conducive to information or to expres
sion of opinion as covered by article 5,1.2 of the West
German Basic Law,

29

Additionally, the Co-determination Act

also excludes religious communities and their associated
charitable and educational institutions.'^

With these

28

The Co-determination Act of 19 76 is reprinted in
ILO, Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany,
cited hereafter as ILO, Co-determination Act of 1976.
29

Article 5, section 1:
"Everyone shall have the
right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech,
writing and pictures and freely inform himself from generally
accessible sources."
30 ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 1, section 2,
paragraph 4, p. 47.
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exemptions, the act applies to all business firms— i.e.,
firms employing in general more than two thousand employees—
that are operated under the legal charter of a corporation, a
partnership limited by shares, a limited-liability company, a
joint stock company of mine owners, or a business cooperative.
Indirect voting via an electoral committee will be
the rule if the number of employees exceeds eight thousand.
As known, indirect voting could favor organized interest
groups, e.g., the unions.

The employees may, however, pass a

resolution for direct voting.

Analogously, employees of a

firm with an employment level below eight thousand may decide
on the technically more efficient device of an electoral
committee.

31

Voting for the salaried and the wage-earning

employees will take place separately if no other resolution
is passed by the employees.

The number of electors for these

two social groups is proportional to the respective number of
employees in the business firm.

As a specific, much debated

provision under the 19 76 Co-determination Act, the group of
salaried employees must include a proportional share of
representatives of so-called managerial salaried employees,
1.e., the employees with management positions.

The number of

electoral representatives in the two groups, whereby one in
cludes the sub-group of managerial salaried employees, is
31

*
ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, part 2, division
2, section 15, paragraphs 1-4, p. 57.

38
. .
. .
.
.
.
32
qualified by a provision protecting minority interests.
The electoral group of the salaried employees must include at
least one managerial salaried employee. 33
Electors of the two committees elect members of the
supervisory board in separate pollings according to the rules
of proportionate voting, but common voting may be decided
upon.

Once more, a rule protecting minority interests ap

plies, and guarantees in the actual circumstance that at
least one member of the group of managerial salaried employees will be on the supervisory board. 34
As under the Works Constitution Act, the unions have
neither a nominating right nor a veto right with respect to
the employees' representatives, all of which must be employed
at the firm under consideration.

Finally, to benefit the

unions' interests, the supervisory board will be completed by
two members who are nominated by the unions and elected by
the employees' electoral committee.

35

In contrast to the

election of the representatives of the two different social
groups within the firm, the union members are elected jointly
32

.
...
ILO, Co-determination Act, 1975, division 2, sub
division 4, section 20, paragraphs 1-3, p. 60.
33

.
ILO, Co-determination Act,
division 4, section 18, paragraph 2,
34
.
ILO, Co-determination Act,
division 3, section 15, paragraph 5,
35
.
ILO, Co-determination Act,
division 3, section 16, paragraphs 1

. .
1976, division 2, sub
p. 60.
. .
19 76, division 2, sub
p. 58.
...
1976, division 2, sub
and 2, p. 59.
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by secret voting of all members of the electoral committee.
A supervisory board with a total of twelve members is
comprised of six representatives for the shareholders, four
for the employees, and two for the unions of the respective
industry, whereby the election of the employees' candidates
is qualified by the provision that at least one member of the
group of the managerial salaried employees must be represented on the board.

36

The members of the supervisory board elect both a
chairperson and a deputy chairperson by a two-thirds majority
vote.

If a majority is not achieved, the shareholders'

members elect the chairman and the employees1 members the
deputy.

37

In general, members of the management board will

be elected by a majority of at least two-thirds of the
supervisory board.

If such a majority cannot be obtained, a

simple majority of board members is sufficient.

In case of

stalemate situations, the chairman of the supervisory board
will cast two ballots.

It is interesting to note that the

new law does not specify any legal provision for election of
a labor director.

38

The description applies to business firms with in
36

ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 2, division 1,
section 7, paragraph 2, p. 51.
37

ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, part 2, division 3,
section 27, paragraphs 1-3, p. 65.
38
But see:
section 33, p. 68.

ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 3,
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general no more than ten thousand employees.

Between 10,000

and 20,000 employees, the number of supervisory board members
amounts to sixteen, including eight labor candidates, of
which only two are nominated by the unions.

An additional

candidate from the unions will be nominated if the board has
a total number of twenty members.

This will be the case if

the total employment level is greater than 20,000 employees.

39

At least a few observations are in order about this
most complex legislative machinery.

The FPD was the princ

ipal proponent of a separate seat on the worker side for the
managerial staff.

The trade unions considered it simply a

method for assuring an employer-point-of-view majority on the
supervisory board, and it would take considerable anti-union
partisanship to see this as anything else. 40

The SPD, on the

other hand, seemed to have been in favor of indirect elections
because it believed the trade unions would be able to control
the process for nominating electors.

The employer side

generally favored direct election, as it favored any sort of
move that would reduce the influence of unions over the
worker representatives.^
Though it might appear that the legislative provisions
of the 1976 act do not necessarily derogate from the principle
39

ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 2, division
1, section 7, paragraph 1, p. 50.
40
p . 83.

E.C.M. Cullmgford, Trade Unions m

West Germany,
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of full-parity co-determination, the sections dealing with
the chairpersonship of the supervisory board and with the
method for breaking tie votes constitute such clear deroga
tions.

The chairperson and the deputy chairperson of the

supervisory board must be elected by a two-thirds majority;
assuming that in most cases a corporate manager is to be
chairperson, they must be able to carry with them at least
some worker votes.

The same would hold true for the deputy

chairperson, who might well be an employee representative.
However, if two-thirds majority cannot be obtained, the
shareholder representatives elect the chairperson and the
employee representatives elect the deputy chairperson.

42

Such an arrangement still might leave the board facing a tie
vote.

Then a second vote is taken and if the result is

again a tie the chairperson has the tie-breaking vote.

At

this point it might be advantageous to observe that the
coal and steel co-determination law (Montan Act) provides
for parity representation, though it also adds a "neutral"
member who could break ties.

However, in the over thirty

years of operation of the Montan Act, there has been no
formal tie-breaking action by the neutral members.

Critics

might argue that no clearer proof is needed of the co-opting
of the trade unions in the FRG; but the evidence also per
mits the observation that frequent recourse to the neutral
42

.
...
ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, part 2, division
3, section 27, paragraph 2.
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tie-breaker would quickly lead to very difficult industrial
relations problems for which mechanical tie-breaking devices
will be of little use.
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Here, then, is the crux of the

concern against any notion that the 19 76 legislation consti
tuted parity co-determination.

The full scope of the

argument that full-parity co-determination would alter the
system of property rights in the FRG, that it would be in
violation of the Basic Law will be examined in Chapter Four,
A fuller understanding of the 1976 legislation can
be obtained by viewing it as simply another step on the road
to industrial democracy.

The parentage of the 19 76 act is

clearly shown by the Montan Act of 1951 and the 1952 Works
Constitution Act.

Both acts have been amended several times

and both continue in force for the types of enterprises
covered by them.
In the Montan A c t !s legislation there is apparent
parity on the supervisory board, but the addition of a
neutral member provides a tie-breaking mechanism; however,
that could rebound to the advantage of labor as well as
management.

One should note that the selection of the

supervisory board has to pass through the annual share
holders * meeting, with the works councils and the unions
making their recommendations to this shareholder instrument.
The principle of outside members of the supervisory board
43 H.A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy
(Oxford:
Basil Blackwell and Mott, Ltd., 1960), p. 51.
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nominated by the trade unions was established here and was
incorporated into the 1976 law, but only after a prolonged
struggle.

From the Montan legislation has also come the

institution of the management board's labor director, who is
nominated by the trade unions and has personnel policy responsibility.44

The 19 76 law divorced the labor director

from union nomination and personnel policy responsibilities,
though the SPD and the CDU are embroiled in a controversy
over the intent of the legislation m

this respect.
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The passage of the Montan Act marked the high-water
mark of the push toward parity co-determination.

The 1952

Works Constitution Act provided for considerably less than
its predecessor.

Employee representatives were limited to

one-third of the supervisory board membership and all the
labor members had to come from within the enterprise; nobody
on the management board directly represented labor in the
day-to-day operation of the enterprise.

One would be hard

pressed to categorize the 1952 legislation as anything but a
trifle tossed labor's way, and there is little evidence that
one-third representation satisfied either the trade unions or
that it had a significant impact on industrial relations.
After 1966, and particularly after 1969, the social-liberal
44 F.E. Emery and Einar Thorsrud, Form and Content m
Industrial Democracy, p. 46.
45 In fact the 19 76 Act was challenged and delayed in
federal constitutional courts; it didn't actually become
fully effective until 1979.
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coalition tried to strengthen the position and powers of the
works councils while also pushing for full-parity co-deter
mination.

They succeeded in the former endeavor--there being

intra-coalition agreement on the works councils— but clearly
failed in the latter.
Consequently, the legislative machinery for industrial
democracy in West Germany is varied.

The variations in

industrial democracy reach all the way from co-determination
in small enterprises employing less than five persons, to the
19 76 Co-determination Act which, it is estimated, will apply
to about six hundred enterprises, employing over four million
46
workers.

Of the five laws, three provide for employee re

presentation on supervisory boards, though taken collectively
they employ only a minority of the work force.

The other two

laws provide for employee representation through the by now
traditional form of the works council, whose significance in
industrial relations should not be minimized. 4 7
The public service sector utilizes a comparable
device, the Personalrat

(personnel board), which covers much

the same ground as the works council in the private and semipublic sector.

But with all the West German publicity about

co-determination— the benefits claimed for it by its
46

Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker
Participation in the Federal Republic of Germany," p. 111.
47

H .A . Cegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy,
pp. 103-105.
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proponents and the dire consequences predicted for political
freedom and the survival of the capitalist order by its
opponents-— well over half

(two-thirds if the public service

sector is included) of the work force do not enjoy the bene
fits of this form of industrial democracy.

They must be

satisfied with representation through the works council or
are deprived of any formal participation in the decision
making process whatsoever.
Possibly one might gain some benefit from a more
detailed examination of existing legislation, but whatever
exists now or is planned for the future functions or will
function in the legislative, structural framework of the
F R G 's polity, society and economy.

Thus before a full

critical evaluation of co-determination in West Germany can
be achieved, it will be necessary to examine the effect that
co-determination has had on the institutional structure of
that nation.

46

CHAPTER IV
CO-DETERMINATION IN WEST GERMANY:

INSTITUTIONAL

CHANGE AND EFFECTIVENESS
Aspects of institutional transformation that bear
most directly on the nature of industrial democracy in the
FRG are discussed below in decreasing order of importance
with regard to co-determination.

These are clearly not

mutually exclusive aspects, but taken in their entirety
should provide a reasonably adequate understanding of the
status of industrial democracy in the context of modern West
Germany.
West Germany and Democratic Corporatism
There is substantial evidence to support the concep
tion of West Germany as a democratic, pluralistic society.
The question that remains is whether the movement toward co
determination adds to the democratic quality of West German
political structures.

To the extent that the 1976 Co-deter-

mination Act does not provide for full-parity co-determina
tion, capitalist company law has not really been superseded.
But the notion that in moving toward parity one moves toward
1
Robert J. Kuhne, "Co-determmation: A Statutory
Restructuring of the Organization," The Columbia Journal of
World Business (Summer, 1979), 17-25.
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some new synthesis

is basic to the present analysis of in

stitutional change

in the FRG.

Legally anchored and government-sponsored labor
management relations take other forms than co-determination.
For example, in the days of the Great Coalition, under the
impact of an economic crisis during 1969, the Konzertierte
Aktion (Concentrated Action) was developed, which is tri
partite machinery for labor, management and government to
discuss economic trends and to shape short and intermediate
2

term wage and price policies.

Labor has complained that the

Aktion always produces much talk about how wages must be kept
in check but often

says little and does less about prices.

Yet the government

does not simply impose itself on the two

partners in industrial relations, and the machinery of the
Konzertierte Aktion contributes in some measure to the per
sistence of corporative perspectives in West Germany.

It is

not possible to make an incontrovertible case for the struct
uring of West German institutions and organizations along
corporative lines, for very traditional state controls
exerted through the central West German banking structure
. .
,
.
3
limits a strictly corporative framework.
2

A.J. Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany; From Bis
marck to Brandt, pp. 511-513.
3
Ralf Dahrendorf, "The New Germanies: Restoration,
Revolution, Reconstruction," Arend Lijphart, ed. Politics in
Europe; Comparisons and Interpretations (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 233-235.
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It can be safely stated that undeniable clout con
tinues to be exercised by big business and industry in the
economic realm and influences the continuation of conservative qualities of West German political patterns.

4

Further

more, proposals for investment control by the central state
authority would certainly undercut the political pluralism
and social structuring of the FRG; proponents of such state
control and direction of investment generally are found on
the radical-to-moderate left, either inside the SPD or out
side of it.

However, to the extent that corporative features

(i.e., functional associations and organizations, legally and
rigidly applied patterns of participation within a defined
context) can be identified in the Federal Republic of Germany,
they would tend to be strengthened and reinforced by co
determination .
Change in West German Politics
Viewing the Federal Republic of Germany from a polit
ical perspective, the seventeen year reign of Konrad Adenauer
and his immediate successors made West Germany into what may
be called a "CDU state," that is to say, a conservative state,
socially, politically and economically.

Certainly there is

evidence of the abandonment of conservative materialistic
attitudes due to generational cleavage in West Germany as in
4

417.

Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy m

Germany, p.
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other European nations, but the pervasive conservatism of
West German society and politics is not really much in dis
pute between those who take pride in it and those who condemn
it.

In this CDU state the SPD has never been able to gain a

clear majority of votes and govern the nation unimpeded by
coalition ties.

Radical critics will probably suggest that

even as the sole majority party the SPD would not have
governed much differently from the record it has made since
1966; no reliable response to such a proposition is possible.
But there is no doubt that the slow and cautious advance
toward parity co-determination must be traced in part to the
inherent conservatism of West Germany and to the continuing
need for coalition politics; the often bitter conflict be
tween the coalition partners as the result of the F D P ’s
holding of a white-collar/executive's representative on the
supervisory board is evidence of the tension within the co. .
5
alition.

The problems of the SPD in developing a consistent

policy line in the socio-economic field can also be traced to
intra-party tensions between the party’s mainstream personnel
in city halls, state and federal parliaments, and the federal
cabinet on one hand, and the party’s youthful constituency on
the other.
Given the degree of inter-party in-fighting, it is
not surprising that the SPD was unable to make good on most
5

Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe:
Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," The
American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 19 71),
991-1017.
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of its major reform promises of the 19 76 election.

It failed

completely on profit-sharing and land use legislation, and
the need to compromise on parity co-determination was so
extensive that SPD trade unionists were taunted by the left
wing of the CDU for succumbing to trade union and party
discipline and voting for a co-determination act that was
unacceptable to even the small CDU trade union faction.
Co-determination and the Constitutional
Structure of West Germany
A comment about chances for co-determination in
British enterprises noted that if West German trade unions,
after a twenty-five year struggle, had been unable to achieve
g
it, how much less the chances would be in Britain.
Such a
comment is misleading not only because it fails to take into
account the complex political situation faced by the SPD, the
West German equivalent of the British Labor Party, but be
cause it also fails to take into account the profound
differences in the constitutional framework of these two
political systems.

While in Britain, parliamentary supremacy

would permit Parliament to enact whatever sort of co-determination legislation would be politically feasible, that is,
by a clear labor party majority and Labor-Trades Union
^Cary L. Cooper, "Employee Participation and Improv
ing the Quality of Working Life," Derek Torrington, ed.
Comparative Industrial Relations in Europe (London: Associated
Business Programs Ltd., 1978), pp. 74-76.
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Congress

(TUC) agreement of the nature of such legislation,

comparable legislation would, and indeed does, face a number
of serious constitutional obstacles in West Germany.
These constitutional obstacles are of two types:
procedural and substantive.

The existence of a Federal

Constitutional Court and the availability of judicial review
make it possible for opponents and critics of certain aspects
of co-determination to raise constitutional issues in the
appropriate federal institution; one might add that state
(Land) governments controlled by anti-co-determination forces
could also raise constitutional issues arising from the
federal nature of the distribution of power in West Germany.
The impetus for substantive constitutional issues
against full-parity co-determination was based on two argu
ments:

that full-parity co-determination would interfere

with the protection of private property, contained in paragraph fourteen of the Basic Law;

7

and that the presence of

an equal number of employee and shareholder representatives
on the supervisory board would not only alter the nature of
collective bargaining between capital and labor as equal
partners, but it would also interfere with labor*s rights of
free association, contained in paragraph nine, section three,
7

Basic Law, Article 14:
(1) ’’Property and the right
of inheritance are guaranteed.
Their content and limits
shall be determined by the laws."

o

of the Basic Law.

Considering the fact that the freedom-of-

association provision was meant to protect bona fide trade
unions against company unions, it seems more than a little
peculiar that present day opponents of co-determination now
express such tender concern for the independence of trade
unions, which might be threatened if their members sat on
company supervisory boards.

This mentioning of issues of

constitutionality involving co-determination is to highlight
still another structural element in the West German situation
that has or might have an impact on the political nature of
co-determination,
West German Trade Unions;

.Co-determination

and Collective Bargaining
Though West German trade unions are no longer
elements of a social movement that advocates workers with a
total socialist environment from which much of the bourgeois
world and culture are excluded, they are still central in
stitutions of working class loyalty and identity.

Their

relationship with the SPD, especially when the party is in
power, is not always an easy one, but discipline on the part
of trade unions in Bonn remains strong— in no small degree
because trade unions claim their share of seats in the
Q

Basic Law, Article 10:
(3) "The right to form
associations to safeguard and improve working and economic
conditions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades, oc
cupations and professions."
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Bundestag and federal cabinet.

It is this strength and

discipline that are bulwarks of the effectiveness of collect
ive bargaining as the principal instrument for making and
enforcing employee demands.
Given the corporatist quality of social organization
in West Germany, there is general acceptance of collective
bargaining as a formal and legitimate decision-making process
m

West German corporatism.

9

Whatever is done through works

councils or through employee representation on the supervisory
boards is always done within the confines of collective bar
gaining between labor and capital, a process in which
government often intervenes indirectly, with the nature of
the intervention depending, obviously, on who controls the
federal political machinery.

But such intervention is

generally considered illegitimate, because legitimacy of
collective bargaining, strikes, and other methods of re
solving employer-employee conflict, are fully accepted not
only in the private but the public sector as well.
Though collective bargaining has been concerned with
the by now traditional elements of industrial relations,
some of the progressive unions, the metal workers among them
(a union which includes all automobile workers in the FRG),
have moved on to the issues of quality of the workplace, with
9

181.

Thomas Kennedy, European Labor Relations, pp. 17 8-
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notable successes on this front.
Evidence of the strength of trade union discipline
and effectiveness, as well as for trade union responsibility,
can be seen in West Germany’s leading other industrialized
countries in low incidence of strikes, moderation in wage
increases, higher worker productivity, etc.

But the unions

are intent on extending their involvement into economic
decision-making by pressing for formal trade union partici
pation in the institutionalization of industrial democracy.
It is this increased involvement that has generated
a heated, sometimes vicious debate over the possibility of
realizing the "trade union state" that classical liberals
and conservatives see just over the proverbial "horizon."
The strong evidence that West German employees in crisis
conditions turn to conservative, if not right-radical,
parties, left-radical trade union bureaucrats might soon
find themselves as so many generals without the necessary
privates to do battle.

The trade-union-state debate testi

fies to the significance of trade unions, their collective
bargaining, general social policy concerns, and the manner in
which the issues of co-determination fits into the general
r

framework of the trade unions as one of the major corporative
pillars of the West German regime.
■^Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker
Participation in the Federal German Republic," p. 97.
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There is one other aspect of trade union involvement
in industrial democracy that deserves some consideration.
Given trade union power in the general area of industrial
relations, their influence over the existing works council
machinery, the possibility of future profit sharing schemes
in which trade unions would administer employees1 shares,
and central government investment control by a government in
which trade unions play a major role, critics may be justi
fied in raising the issue of dominant representation.
under such conditions, employees

If,

(trade unions) have numeric

al parity on supervisory boards, the total impact of trade
union power would overbear the voice and influence of share
holders and managers. ^

However, realization of such a

possibility might be cut short by CDU success in a forth
coming election— not at all an unlikely possibility— in 19 84
given the narrow margin of the SPD-FPD victory in 19 80.
West German Co-determination and
the European Community
Presently and in the immediate future, establishing
systems of co-determination within the various nations of
Western Europe will be determined chiefly by domestic factors.
Currently there exists profound variations in the approaches
to industrial democracy in Western Europe.

But one ought to

"^Gerard Braunthal, The Federation of Germany Industry in Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1965), pp. 270-275.
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keep in mind that developments are under way on the supra
national level that will eventually create constraints on
national decision-making in that context.
Though a common European company law is still far
from being realized, once such harmonization has been
achieved, the manner in which employees will be able to
participate in company decision-making will then have to be
contoured into a supranational instrument.

It might be that

demands for co-determination that cannot be obtained in a
purely national context could be secured under the pressure
of a common front of transnational trade unions and a common
European company law.

12

Co-determination as a National Symbol
The traditional trade union perception of co-deter
mination in West Germany has always been that of a means to
an end.

Generally speaking, trade unions have taken an

instrumental, utilitarian view of such measures.

Their per

ception has also eschewed a view of co-determination as a
way of transforming the existing social order.

Rather, it

has lead to a more equal relationship between labor and
12

See George Sanderson, gen. ed., Industrial Democracy
Today: A New Role for Labor (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1979),
Recent Developments in the International Work Environment, by
Eric Trist, pp. 56-62; Thomas Kennedy, European Labor Rela
tions , pp. 377-394; Roger Harrison, Workers1 Participation in
Western Europe, pp. 7-10; Derek Torrington, ed., Comparative
Industrial Relations in Europe, The Future of Industrial
Relations in Europe, by Jack A. Peel, pp. 253-269.
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capital and not to the elimination of the capitalist order as
it is known.

These have been the standard positions of the

DGB and it is difficult to interpret such pronouncements as
any sort of revolutionary intentions.
Taking into account the generally moderate ideology
of most of the D G B 1s constituent unions and of the majority
of the SPD, and considering also the development of West
Germany's economy as one of the healthier of the capitalist
economies, albeit functioning in a corporative framework of
legally defined parameters of operation, one is tempted to
inquire what the co-determination debate has been all about.
Has co-determination become a historic demand of the labor
movement that no one has the courage to remove from its
place of honor?

Has co-determination variations, either in

the coal and steel version or its works council version
really improved the life of the work force?

Has it really

served to constrain the capitalistic, autocratic managers
from their preferred alternatives in industrial relations
and economic policy?
In short, have the voices of the working man and his
representatives received a genuine hearing, and have employee
representatives on the supervisory boards and the elaborate
machinery of works councils altered economic policy and
industrial relations in the Federal Republic of Germany?
Unless unambiguous answers can be given to these questions—
a doubtful possibility--the record of the struggle over
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co-determination, at least in the years since 1969, has many
of the earmarks of a futile exercise in symbolic representa
tion.

To say so is not to denigrate the importance or

significance of symbols in the political process.

At the

same time, if co-determination has only become a symbol,
might not the trade unions and the SPD have diverted their
energies in another direction, if they wanted to have a
greater say in West German social policy and economic
decision-making?
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CHAPTER V
PERIPHERAL ISSUES OF INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY IN WEST GERMANY
The assumption of a homogenous, mono-cultural work
force is common to most writers on employee participation,
self-management, and industrial democracy.

Yet the indus

trial work forces of the capitalist western world are
increasingly heterogeneous, not only in terms of race and
ethnicity, but also in terms of age, sex, religion, occupa
tion, education, technology, and industry.

The intent of

this chapter is to initiate discussion and raise questions
concerning some of the peripheral, yet complex issues which
need to be studied if one is to understand the inter
relationship between a heterogeneous work force and industrial
democracy in West Germany.

West German experience will be

primarily drawn upon but the issues raised are relevant to
other advanced industrial nations.
Among the most neglected people in terms of develop
ment and participation in industrial democracy are the
migrant and immigrant workers.

These people have been

treated with little consideration by the governments, em
ployers, and the many trade unions in the Federal Republic
of Germany.

The traditional methods developed to protect
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industrial employees against accidents, disease, and exploi
tation are usually inadequate, inappropriate, or simply not
applied to foreign workers.

Ideas, policies, and proposals

for industrial democracy developed by scholars, governments,
managers, and trade unions tend to ignore the foreign work
ers, or assume they will become absorbed or assimilated, or
at best they will be given token formal recognition without
making provisions for the special difficulties they confront
in being involved in any form of industrial democracy.
What then are some of the key issues which need to
be examined in relation to migrant and immigrant workers and
industrial democracy?

Although West Germany probably repre

sents a moderate case in terms of diversity of national,
linguistic, and cultural backgrounds in its industrial work
force, the issues raised are likely to be relevant to other
countries with large migrant work forces.
However, even moderate diversity in West Germany*s
industrial work force makes industrial democracy a very
complex issue in many plants, enterprises, and industries.
For example, in one plant in Dortmund, in a work force of
around 430 employees, there are members of thirty-nine
national groups other than German.'*'

One large conglomerate

at the end of 19 76 had sixty-nine national groupings in its
work force.

The percentage of migrants and the national mix

^"Kennedy, European Labor Relations, pp. 228-229.
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varies considerably between the different production units of
industry.

The work force in the largest plant in the basic

steel industry comprises nearly seventy various countries of
origin.

The ethnic diversity is even more involved.

For

instance, Yugoslavs in West Germany come from such diverse
cultural and often mutually hostile groups as Croats, Serbs,
Macedonians, and even Albanian

(from the Yugoslavian republics

2

of Montenegro and Macedonia).

If foreign workers are to be able to participate
fully in industrial democracy, then they must develop
appropriate written and verbal skills in the German language.
Reliance on interpreters may do more to increase the power
and influence of interpreters than the power and influence
of foreign workers.

Sweden is the only nation of Western

Europe where the law requires an employer to provide newly
arrived foreign workers with opportunities to learn the local
language in their first year of employment.

However, there

seems to be some question as to how many employers in Sweden
are fulfilling this particular legal requirement. 3

Else

where, employer language training for foreign workers tends
to be inadequate and narrowly related to technicalities of
of job requirements and not to developing fluency for the
2

Demetrios G. Papademetnou, "European Labor Migra
tion:
Consequences for the Countries of Ttforker Oriqin,"
International Studies Quarterly 22 (September 1978), 377-409.
3
Jenkins, Job Power, pp. 258-273.
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levels of understanding of issues involved in industrial
democracy.

Also, many adult foreign workers have little in

centive to learn the language, since they have little contact
with people outside their linguistic and cultural groups.

4

Mere fluency in the language is not in itself suffi
cient to allow people to participate in discussions which
require an ability to understand and evaluate ideas, concepts,
and processes, particularly when these cannot be related to
foreign workers1 education or experience.

As an example,

foreign workers who have migrated to West Germany from
southern or eastern Europe cannot be expected to understand
the complex nature and procedures of the long-established
West German industrial institution of co-determination.
Additionally, many of these foreign workers come from
authoritarian cultures where they have been educated with
values and expectations which discourage participation in
democratic processes, and even penalize individuals who
suggest or espouse them.

It is hardly a firm basis for the

development of industrial democracy,

A further problem is

that many foreign workers are unaware of, or confused over,
just what are their democratic and industrial rights.

Some

foreign workers do not realize that they have the right to
vote in union elections even though not a citizen in the
4
Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, European Economic Com
munity Migrations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969),
passim.
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nation of employment.
In a multi-ethnic work force certain individuals may
gain power and influence because they function as links be
tween management and particular ethnic employee groups.

As

an example, a pay clerk may be seen by many foreign workers
as powerful and influential because he is responsible for
giving them their paychecks and therefore must be respected.
It is common practice for some companies to employ multi
lingual people in this position and to use them also as
interpreters and interviewers, thus increasing their power
to influence both management and foreign workers.

Under any

system of industrial democracy such people could control
many votes.
Another important societal group which tends to be
relegated to the periphery by writers and decision-makers
on industrial democracy in West Germany is that of women in
general, and married women in particular.

The members of

this group have greatly increased their numbers in the work
force of West Germany in recent years.

In West Germany the

participation rate of married women in the work force has
doubled in the last thirty years to nearly forty percent.
Yet their participation in union decision-making processes
and senior management boards is almost negligible.

The

problem is even more serious for foreign married women whose
participation in the work force is even higher than that of
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West German born married women.

5

The participation of women in the processes of in
dustrial democracy is severely restricted by their socializa
tion and the fact that they often carry the onus of two
full-time occupations:
housewife and mother.

one as an employee and one as a
Any attempts to improve the position

of women in the processes of industrial democracy must there
fore acknowledge the considerable diversity in the socializa
tion, cultures, and domestic roles of women in a multi-ethnic
and multi-racial work force.

g

The majority of migrant and immigrant women have
little or no understanding of industrial processes and the
wider economic, social, and political systems of an industrial
community.

They often carry out the dirtiest and most menial

tasks, yet they fear the loss of even these jobs.

Their

sense of isolation and powerlessness is compounded daily,
with little hope for any change in the situation.
Concepts of industrial democracy normally assume that
the people understand and agree with the processes of democ
racy and are free and willing to express opinions and assume
some responsibility for decision-making.

Such assumptions

are often contrary to the values and customs of many foreign
5

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, gen. ed., The Civic
Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980),
Changing German Political Culture by David P. Conradt, p. 255.
^Jenny Dorling, "Women and Work," in Comparative Industrial Relations in Europe, ed. Derek Torrington, pp.
194-212.
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households.

For example, Turkish women who are culturally-

conditioned not to speak up, and certainly not to converse
with males other than their husbands, would face enormous
problems of role conflict if they were allowed to participate
in industrial democracy.
The insensitivity of some people to role conflict may
be exemplified by a female personnel officer

(herself a

foreign worker) who admonishes Turkish men for their treatment
of their wives, and admonishes the wives for accepting their
culturally conditioned role.

Admonition from a person in

such a position of perceived power adds considerably to a
foreign worker's fears and anguish and probably reduces their
. .
.
.
7
participation m any decision-making processes.
A crucial aspect of the current world recession,
particularly in West Germany, is that powerful and privileged
groups openly assert their rights to maintain their standard
of living.

These groups include secure public servants and

people in highly protected businesses and industries.

The

costs of the current recession and consequent structural ad
justments in the economy are therefore inequitably distributed,
the burden falling largely on the increasing number of un
employed.
Will industrial democracy further disadvantage the
unemployed by excluding them from access to important
7

p. 67.

Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy m

Germany,
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decisions, particularly those relating to employment?

Will

industrial democracy further help the existing work force to
protect themselves through employment security agreements or
tenured appointments, to the detriment of those trying to
enter the work force?

It is especially important to the in

creasing number of youth who cannot gain access to employment.
However, those youths lucky enough to have jobs are only in
directly represented on the works councils of their companies
by a youth delegation.

8

Industrial democracy and employee participation
should not be limited to the mainstream of the industrial
work force.

While the above-mentioned groups are only a

minority of the work force, it is in the best interest of
industrial harmony for all workers to participate equally
and equitably,

The heterogenity of the West Germany indus

trial work force and its parent society has been beneficial
to industrial unity.

But unity is only as cohesive as the

components desire it to be.

Chapter Six, then, will serve

as a conclusion and as an evaluation.

A conclusion, in the

sense of summarizing the significance and relevance of co
determination in West Germany, and for the rest of the
Western world.

An evaluation, in that it undertakes a

critical examination of the thesis for its affirmability or
its dismissal.
o

ILO, Works Constitution Act, 19 72, part 3, division
1, sections 60-71, pp. 134-139,
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CHAPTER VI
CO-DETERMINATION AND PARTICIPATION:

THE

THESIS AFFIRMED— OR IS IT?
Answers to three questions have been sought:

what

has been the West German record in achieving co-determination
in industrial decision-making?

Why have particular versions

of co-determination been adopted in the Federal Republic of
Germany?

And finally, what difference has it all made in

the structure and functioning of the West German polity and
in the nature of political participation in particular?
Answers to the first two of these questions have taken up
the bulk of the thesis; some consideration of the third query
will follow.

However, before turning to this task, it is

necessary to summarize briefly what has been said with regard
to the first two.
Various forms of co-determination in effect in the
Federal Republic of Germany range from no co-determination
in very small establishments to the 19 76 version of balanced,
but not parity, co-determination in large corporations em
ploying more than two thousand employees.

There are three

types of co-determination in which employee representatives
sit on the supervisory boards, in equal numbers in the newly
adopted law and in the Montan version of 1951, and in less
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than equal numbers in the Works Constitution Act version of
1952.

Thus employee representatives are either clearly out

numbered, or where they are equal in number of shareholder's
representatives, the latter effectively can override the
voice of the employees.
In the public service and in the 1952 works council
version employees are limited to representation on the per
sonnel boards and the works councils, respectively, though
one must not minimize the significance of this representative
device for inserting the employees'

(and their unions')

voice into industrial decision-making, covering working con
ditions and the nature of work and of the workplace in the
widest sense.^

There is also a strong record of employee

consultation by management on a broad range of issues, as
well as a strong sense of worker solidarity behind the works
councils.
The reasons why a complex social relations pattern
like co-determination takes a particular form in a given
national society are always multifarious and most difficult
to disentangle,

An attempt has been made to specify two

sets of contextual conditions.

Thus, historical forces

reaching back one hundred years and more, plus contemporary
economic and political structural elements have combined to
^"Richard J. Willey, Democracy in the West German
Trade Unions: A Reappraisal of the Iron Law (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 4-13.
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give West German co-determination its particular quality.
The specific form of co-determination, which has
focused on having employee representatives sit on company
boards, has been shaped by the German labor movement's
historic preference for evolutionary over revolutionary
methods of social change and by strong bureaucratic tenden
cies that have reinforced its evolutionary preferences.
Concurrently, the strength of the Works Council Movement in
post-1918 Germany made this form of employee representation
an important weapon in the arsenal of the German labor movement.

2

.

Yet even here the evolutionary and bureaucratizing

tendencies of the movement quickly stripped the Works Council
Movement of its broader political aims and of its radical
. .
. .
3
political ambitions.
The manner in which co-determination evolved after
19 49 has been strongly influenced by the sort of structural
variables analyzed earlier.

The first three of these—

collective bargaining, pluralistic corporatism, and the
political dynamics of West Germany— clearly have had a deci
sive influence on the manner in which co-determination has
developed and functioned in the Federal Republic of Germany.
2

H.A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy,
pp. 3-17; Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology
of Participation (New York:
Schocken Books, 1968), pp. 139167.
3Lewis J. Edm g e r , Politics m Germany: Attitudes
and Processes (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp.
226-227.
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The acceptance of collective bargaining as a legitimate form
of industrial relations strongly supplements the representa
tion of employees on the boards and in the works councils,
thus adding to West Germany’s socio-economic corporative
structuring.

In the context of the three structural elements,

co-determination may be seen as one of several weapons at the
disposal of the labor movement to make demands on behalf of
its members.
The fourth factor, West German political dynamics,
serves more to indicate the parameters— or weaknesses— of
the West German labor movement than its strengths.

The in

ability of the SPD and the trade unions to muster a clear
majority in the Bundestag for their programs is clearly a
limiting factor, especially as long as these twin organiza
tional giants remain committed to democratic politics and to
the ballot box.

4

The obstacles represented by the West German

basic law would become insignificant in the face of a deter
mined majority thrust.

But here, too, the SPD and the trade

unions might be confronted with internal dissension, should
they try to use their majoritarian strength to override in
an undemocratic manner minority views voiced on the national
level or those opposition views that draw their power from
the operation of the federal system.

How much direct impact

4
John D. May, "Democracy, Organization, Michels,"
The American Political Science Review 59 (June, 1965), pp.
417-429.
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the developments on the supra-national level— in the European
community and beyond--have on the shape of co-determination in
West Germany is relatively easy to assess:
least for the short term.

very little, at

But even in the long term the

problems of putting the DGB under the same roof with France *s
Confederation General du Travail

(CGT) and Italy's Confeder-

azione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) rather boggle the
imagination.
Can it be said, then, with any degree of confidence
that West German co-determination has been a significant
instrument in the hands of West German labor in its effort to
transform the country’s economy and political relations in
conformity with its goals?

Certainly one will never be able

to say how different economic and political relations, de
fined broadly, would have been if the labor movement had
concentrated solely on collective bargaining in the economic
realm and welfare legislation in the political arena.
What is suggested here is the German (or since 1949
the West German) version of industrial democracy clearly
bears the stamp of the peculiar national experience of that
particular labor movement.

But the achievements on the path

to industrial democracy so far are more nearly system main
taining rather than system transforming in nature.

This has

been so not only, or perhaps not even chiefly, because of
the political and economic constraints imposed on the labor
movement, but because the movement— at least since 1949— has
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moved along almost entirely within a moderate, evolutionary
ambience.

What has been achieved, though it is quite far

removed from full-parity co-determination, does not do as
much violence to the labor movement's realistic goals as the
spokesmen for that movement would declare.

Simultaneously—

and without meaning to contradict what has just been said-even if full-parity co-determination had been achieved, it
would not have been the occasion for a radical transformation
of West German society, economy or politics, even though the
DGB is clearly on record with its determination to continue
its push for full parity.

5

Thomas Mann constructed a conversation between Con
sul Buddenbrook and his employees during the revolutionary
days of the 1848 republic.

Sensing the political dissatis

faction of his employees he asks them:
Tell me."

To which one of them replies:

"What do you want?
"Well, Consul

Buddenbrook, all I can say is that we want a republic."

"But

we already have a republic, you stupid man," Buddenbrook
replies with some exasperation.

"Well, Consul Buddenbrook,"

the employee's response comes, "in that case we want another
one."

g

A sizable segment of party and trade unions must

surely feel that very same way about the 19 76 co-determination
5Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker
Participation in the F R G ," pp. 90-94.
c

Thomas Mann, Buddenbrooks, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter
(New York: A.A. Kopf, 1964).
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law:

if that is co-determination then we simply have to have

another one.

But given the West German society1s record with

republics in 1848 and later, one would no more be justified
in expecting radical results in the realm of economic democ
racy than in that of political democracy.

Most observers

agree that, with the adoption and the coming into force of
the 1976 Co-determination Law, the issue of industrial democ
racy has been, for all practical purposes, removed from a top
. .
7
position on the F R G 1s political agenda.

But it says less

about the intrinsic significance of West Germany's methods
for insuring industrial democracy than about the conservative
nature of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Thus it would seem that the prospects for full-parity
employee participation in West Germany are not very bright.
Any further efforts to limit the power of the managers/share
holders will surely be resisted strongly.

Yet the West German

labor movement has achieved a considerable degree of influence
over economic decision-making through collective bargaining
and works councils, as well as through the working of the
corporatist machinery.
Is this experience relevant to other post-industrial
societies?
vanced.

Three very tentative suggestions might be ad

First, formulas for industrial democracy, like those

7
F.E. Emery, "The Next Thirty Years:
Concepts,
Methods and Anticipation," Human Relations 20 (August, 1967),
199-235.
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for political democracy, are just that:

instrumentalities

that must be made to work in a complex environment and whose
success depends chiefly on the manner in which these instru
mentalities fit into the larger political context.

Second,

socio-economic corporatism along the lines of the West German
version is likely to be a conservative influence; that is to
say, it will serve to maintain the social and political status
quo, even though it might permit a large degree of technologic
al innovation.

These systems will look very modern in the

technological sense but will tend to maintain a very trad
itional socio-political set of institutional arrangements.
Third, in such a corporatist system the technocrats
will more likely remain confined to their realm of expertise
and will not reach out for power in other realms, as might be
the case in non-corporatist systems.

Such a hypothesis runs

contrary to much of what is being said about the growing power
of technocrats--military or civilian— in various parts of the
world.

It would seem that in socio-economic corporatism

wedded to a pluralistic political arrangement, as is the case
in West Germany, the technocrats will confine themselves to
their realm of expertise, for the corporative structure vests
them with considerable influence in such a role.

8

Because the Federal Republic of Germany might be
what psychologists call a strong deviant case, it might be

g

David Jenkins, Job Power, p. 300.
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difficult to construct a sound framework for comparative
analysis with other industrializing or post-industrial
nations.

However, there is little that deserves more atten

tion than gaining an understanding of the inter-action
between demands for industrial democracy and the increasing
tendencies toward socio-economic corporatism in such nations.
It is this concern that has justified the present analysis
and that ought to encourage further exploration elsewhere,
in the form of empirical studies and comparative analysis.
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